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BOTH ENDS AGAINST THE MIDDLE
By JEROME FRANK

t

I
THE IMMEDIATELY PRACTICAL

1.

Twenty years ago, I published an article on the subject of legal
education. I expanded it in a talk two years later. Hoping to gain
converts, I have published that talk several times, under different titles,
with slight variations. For the most part, my views, at least until
very recently, received from legal educators either complete silence or
rather vigorous rejoinders.
I would like to think that those rejoinders indicated something to
which Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes once referred: "A loud outcry on
a slight touch reveals the weak spot in a profession, as well as in a
patient." On the other hand, I remember that Dr. Holmes also said:
"A writer rarely has as many enemies as it pleases him to believe.
Self-love leads us to over-rate the numbers of our negative constituency." At any rate, with slightly diminishing aversion, recently my
views have been discussed by some American and Canadian legal pedagogues; and, not long since, one of my bosses, Mr. Justice Jackson,
expressed ideas about legal education quite like those I've often voiced.*

2.
Throughout this paper, I shall use "I" instead of apparently more
impersonal terms. This use involves no egotism. On the contrary, it
helps to remove a false air of Jovian infallibility, and to expose the
more easily to criticism the personal notions here expressed.
I am an ardent friend of the university law schools. Precisely
because I think they have done an exceptionally good job, I want them
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
This paper was read before the Section on Legal Education of the American
Bar Association, September, 1950.
* Some six months after this paper was read, Dean Levi delivered an address
in which he seemed to promise that the University of Chicago Law School will adopt
something of the sort of clinical teaching I have long advocated. See Levi, Wzhat
Can the Law Schools Do?, 18 U. OF CH. L. REv. 746 (1951).
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to do still better, and I therefore venture to state what I deem their
faults. But first I must acknowledge their virtues.
Those law schools have supplied leadership in our profession.
Most practicing lawyers are so busy with the pressing daily tasks of
practice that they have little time or energy to devote to contriving
needed reforms of the legal status quo. Consequently, progress in
lawyerdom has come, in considerable part, from the law schools.
Those schools fostered the judicial shift from a hostile to a
generous attitude towards legislation. Recognition by the bar of the
practical importance to lawyers of a knowledge of economics began in
those schools. To Professor Wigmore of Northwestern and to Professor Morgan of Harvard we owe many improvements in the evidence
rules; to Professor Borchard of Yale, the declaratory judgment statutes; to Dean Sturges, the increased interest among lawyers in arbitration; to Dean (now Judge) Charles E. Clark, many of the recent
great reforms of the procedural rules. The law schools, then, play an
outstanding, an indispensable, role in improving the administration of
justice.
More important, it is in their law school days that future lawyers
have the time and the urge to consider at length social and moral ideals
and problems of justice. Ideals implanted in law students flower in
later years.
But the law schools have insulated themselves and their students
from intimate knowledge of large segments of the doings of courts and
lawyers. As a consequence, they neither equip their students, as well
as they could, to practice effectively, nor exercise leadership in bringing
about much needed reforms in those segments of lawyerdom on which
they have unwisely turned their backs.
3.
To put it bluntly, my fundamental criticism is that the law schools
remain too much under the influence of Langdell. His avowed basic
tenets were these: "First that Law is a science; second, that all materials of that science are contained in books." He said: "What
qualifies a person to teach law is not experience in the work of a
lawyer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in
the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in short, in using law,
but experience in learning law . .

."

He declared that "the library

is to us what the laboratory is to the chemist or the physicist . . ."
Under Langdell, Harvard Law School' became an institution devoted to libiary law, with the library as its sole laboratory. Anything
not discoverable in the library, anything outside the law books, was
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not "scientific" and was therefore to be scorned. The principal implement of this alleged "science" was the so-called "case-book"-not, as
its name implied, a collection of all the printed material relating to
cases, but merely of judicial opinions, mostly those of upper courts.
Soon all the university law schools aped Harvard. All became
library-law-schools. Essentially, most of them still are. True, the
newer case books contain some matter other than court opinions, including matter taken from the so-called "social sciences." There are
now also courses in, and case books on, legislation and the administrative process; jurisprudence is taught; and some other new features,
which I shall mention later, have been added. Generally, however,
there still persists the Langdellian aloofness from "experience in dealing
with men," from first-hand observation, first-hand knowledge, of the
work of courts and of lawyers.
4.
In all fairness, it must be said that the Langdell method, especially
as recently modified, has achieved signal success in equipping law
students for actual practice in the upper courts. The reason is obvious:
upper courts are, in essence, library-law courts. One can, therefore,
without ever entering a courtroom, learn a great deal about the uppercourt phases of the judicial process. The study of appellate court
opinions, if coupled, as it now is in most law schools, with intensive
study of the printed records and briefs in a few selected cases, will give
the students fairly accurate understanding of how upper courts function. And arguments by the students in moot appellate courts have
increased that understanding. So, too, has the teaching of some law
teachers, who impart wisdom concerning the more subtle personal
factors in appellate court operations.
Accordingly, the transition from the law schools to upper court
practice or upper court judging is not too hard. Lawyers just out of
law school often do amazingly well as advocates in cases on appeal.
I have seen some of them lick the daylights out of eminent leaders of
the bar. And law professors, having no experience in "practicing law,"
make first-rate appellate judges. Without much difficulty, anyone of
my law clerks could take my place on the bench, and would better my
performance.
In other words, so far as appellate courts are concerned, the insulation of the students from first-hand observation of lawyers and courts
does little harm. That little harm is offset by the schools' magnificent
probing of the appellate judicial process.
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5.
But a huge gap does exist between the law schools' "library law"
and the trial courts. Here I must dwell on something that should be
obvious to every lawyer but that many lawyers and law teachers
curiously neglect: trial courts differ in one major respect from upper
courts.
An upper court, generally speaking, has one function; a trial court
has two functions. The prime function of the upper court is to ensure,
as far as possible, that the legal rules have been correctly interpreted
and applied to the facts-as those facts have been "found" by the trial
courts. The trial court, however, must not only interpret and apply
the rules; it also has a task not usually performed by an upper courtthat of "finding" the facts. This second or distinctive function allotted
to the trial court-"finding" the facts-depends, in the great majority
of cases, on a determination of the credibility of witnesses who testify
orally and, ordinarily, disagree with one another. It is generally considered-and, I think, on the whole; correctly-that in determining
which of the disagreeing witnesses are reliable and accurate, much
significance should be accorded to the trial courts' observation of the
demeanor of the several witnesses as they testify.
Since the upper court judges cannot see and hear the witnesses,
they cannot, where the testimony was oral and in conflict, competently
"find" the basic facts. Consequently, in such cases, the upper courts
usually accept the trial courts' basic findings of fact-such as whether
Joe Cain stabbed Sam Abel, or Will Meek promised to sell his house
to Aleck Sharp, or Henry Gotrox who willed all his property to Susan
Brighteyes was unduly under her influence, or Alfred Recdess was
driving seventy miles an hour when he ran over little Bobby Mild.
And, because, in the huge majority of cases, no dispute occurs as to
the applicable legal rules, because most law suits are but "fact suits,"
most trial-court decisions are not appealed; and, on that account, the
upper courts affirm a very large percentage of the few appealed cases.
Trial court decisions are therefore often final, principally because
those courts possess an almost uncontrollable "fact discretion"-that
is, a discretion in picking out those witnesses whose oral testimony is
to be taken as true. Because of this "fact discretion," reference is
sometimes made to the "sovereignty" of the trial courts.
Now no rules can govern the exercise of that discretion, that
"sovereignty." I mean no rules-substantive or procedural---can tell
a judge that an orally testifying witness should or should not be trusted.
James Stephen said that only "exceptional cases . . .present any legal
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difficulties" but that "no trial ever occurs" in which the trial judge is

not required to "exercise the faculty" of telling "whether a witness is
or is not lying." "This preeminently important power," Stephen continued, "is not to be learned out of books," since "no rules can be laid
down for its acquisition." Henry Maine agreed, saying that there
can be no rules by which a judge can attain the ability "to make allowance for the ignorance or timidity of witnesses, or to see through the
confident and plausible liar."
It follows that the exercise of the trial courts' "fact discretion"
or "sovereignty" is un-ruly. Also unruly-beyond control by rulesare factors which vitally affect trial court decisions, such factors as
these: the mistakes made by witnesses in their observations of the
facts as to which they testify; their mistakes in remembering those
observations; their unconscious biases and prejudices; the unconscious
prejudices of trial judges or jurors for or against particular witnesses,
or litigants, or lawyers.
Nothing in print-nothing in the library that a law student reads
-is able to capture or reflect those unruly factors. They are not to be
found in court opinions or records or briefs. No more are many of
the activities of lawyers when preparing for trial-the details of their
oral interviews with witnesses and clients, or the like. All such things
are off the beat of the library lawyer; they don't go on inside the
library-laboratory.
6.
Due largely to the insufficiency of library-law school- educationto the law schools' treatment of trial courts as if they were unwanied
illegitimate children-very few of the ablest university law school graduates become trial lawyers. Most of them become either upper court
lawyers or "office" lawyers.
It is argued, however, that the schools should not specialize in
litigation. I thoroughly agree. There are other matters of which the
students should learn: (1) Lawyers act as advisors to policy makersin government, in business, in the management of labor unions. (2)
The legislative process surely deserves the attention the schools now
give it (although Professor Horack correctly says that too many law
teachers ignore the "fact that there is no sharp line between 'the legislative and judicial process," since "much litigation begins in the legislative committee . .

.,

is transferred to the courts, and is ultimately

decided by the Supreme Court.") (3) There are also large stretches
of governmental administration which the courts seldom touch.
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(4) Then, too, there is the work of lawyers in drafting instruments, in
negotiations, in advising clients before litigation breaks out, and in
preventing litigation.
Always, however, the shadow of possible litigation hangs over
all those doings: legislation usually gets its meaning in law suits; administrative action, in one way or another, may be hauled into court;
a lawyer's advice in anticipation of litigation, or its settlement, requires
an educated guess as to what will happen, should a law suit occur.
Almost any product of a lawyer's office work-a contract, a will,
a trust deed, a corporate charter, an administrative regulation-may
at any time be subjected to the ordeal of litigation. Cravath is quoted
as having wisely said that no lawyer who hasn't tried jury cases should
be permitted to draft a reorganization agreement. I would say the
same of a lawyer who acts as an adviser to policy-makers, for often the
wisest policy meets defeat if incompetently defended in a trial court.
The trial lawyer knows that many times the parol evidence rule and
the statute of frauds do not protect from successful assaults the most
carefully prepared written instruments. Oral testimony, honest, biased,
or prejudiced, often plays havoc with the lawyer's paper work. The
demeanor of adverse witnesses frequently counts for more with a trial
judge or a jury than a solemn writing, whether it be a contract, an
administrative regulation or a statute. Trials thus create hazards of
which the mere library-trained office lawyer is insufficiently aware.
Accordingly, litigation, actual or potential, should be the concern
of every lawyer. Indeed, in the last analysis, it is the existence of
courts that justifies the existence of the legal profession. There have
been lawyerless courts. A courtless, litigation-less legal profession is
unthinkable.
Now, knowledge of litigation is superficial if it does not include
knowledge of trials. The guess of the office lawyer about the effects
of a possible law suit will be a badly educated guess, if he is acquainted
solely with appellate practice. He will think of facts only as they show
up in an appellate court opinion or an appellate record-after a trial
court, in the course of deciding a case, has "found" them. But, usually,
when a case is on appeal, the facts, because of the trial court's previous
findings, have been simplified, have been purged of the complexities
and doubts due to the conflicts in the oral testimony.
Moreover, the ways in which lawyers do much of their nonlitigious office work can't be learned in the library. No books, and no
instruction founded on books, will teach the art of negotiation or the
art of dealing with clients. Books and talk about books do not convey
the necessary "feel."
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In sum, most law schools omit the contacts, the face-to-face relations, with flesh-and-blood human beings, including witnesses, clients,
jurors, trial judges, administrators, members of legislative committees.
Those personal contacts are at the center of lawyer's practice. Without an understanding of them, legal learning is a bloodless, fleshless
skeleton. To put it differently, the legal rules and principles are pallid,
devitalized, except in the context of personal relations.
Clearly, then, the law schools go astray when they still follow
Langdell in considering the library the student's sole laboratory. It is,
of course, one of his laboratories. But his chief laboratories should be
the courts (particularly the trial courts), the legislative committees,
the administrative agencies, and the law offices. Only a stubborn
adherence to a seventy year old tradition in legal education explains
the schools' snobbish disdain of those laboratories.
7.
One most unfortunate result of the schools' snobbish attitude to
the trial courts has been the dissemination of the upper court myththe hopelessly false belief that the upper courts are at the heart of the
judicial system, that they can and will correet almost all the errors and
blunders of the trial courts. I call that a myth, for this reason: Most
trial court decisions are final and not reversible on appeal because, as
I have said, they turn on determinations of fact based on trial court
evaluations of credibility. Most trial court mistakes in evaluating oral
testimony are therefore irremediable. The trial court decisions accordingly affect the lives of thousands of litigants, as upper court decisions do not. Wherefore the trial courts, not the upper courts, are
at the heart of the judicial process. Their work is of paramount importance in the judicial administration of justice.
The law schools, however, shove off to the shadowy outer edges
of attention what goes on in trial courts. This eventuates in a thoughtsystem which treats upper court happenings as the usual, the normal,
and treats the happenings peculiar to trials as unusual, exceptional,
bizarre, and negligibly abnormal. This is upside-down legal thinking,
since, in court-house government, trials are the usual, the normal. It
is as if American agricultural schools were to teach their students that
rainy weather is abnormal, of slight importance.
The legal thought-system of the law schools is flat, two-dimensional. Only by taking full account of trials can it become, as it should,
three-dimensional. Thinking about a three-dimensional court-house
world in two-dimensional terms creates systematic delusions. The
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schools' thought-system seems sound only because it excludes the baffling facts that won't fit into it. That pat, tidy system should be
smashed. To borrow a phrase from Whitehead, this can be done by
making "observations beyond the boundaries of delusive completeness,"
observations which will "rescue the facts in the discard."
The law schools have been brilliant, constructive critics of appellate courts. As an upper court judge, I am glad to testify that
articles in the law school journals prove incalculably helpful in deciding
appealed cases. But the schools have done next to nothing in examining and criticizing these distinctive trial court happenings that are
not capable of being reduced to rules.
Many of our methods in the conduct of trials are antiquated,
demonstrably unjust, and badly in need of drastic reform. They bring
about needless tragedies resulting from avoidable mistakes in ascertaining the facts in law suits. In criminal cases, these mistakes have sent
too many innocent men to jail. In civil suits, they have too .often
unjustly ruined men financially or deprived them of their reputations.
If you think those comments undeservedly harsh, I invite you to
remember that our trial methods induced Judge Learned Hand to feel
that a law suit is to be dreaded "beyond almost anything short of sickness or death," and to say that "about trials hang a suspicion of
trickery and a sense of result depending upon-cajolery or worse." Yet,
with a very few notable exceptions, law teachers have devoted no time
to critical study of the trial practices that Judge Hand condemned, and
to the avoidable tragedies they cause.
Those tragedies pose to the legal profession a moral problem of
the first magnitude. No one can quarrel with lawyers who maintain
that our profession should interest itself in moral problems not directly
germane to our profession-for instance, those relative to housing or
medical care. But a moral problem directly affecting the work of the
courts is uniquely our responsibility, since lawyers alone have the
skills requisite to its solution, so far as it can be solved. If we do not
put our own house in order, we will look like meddlesome busybodies
when we go about telling other professions how to run theirs.
Here the law schools ought to take the lead. This they could do
by requiring first-hand observation of the trial courts, in that .way
bringing home to their students the gravity of this moral problem.
Then, before too long, practical projects for reform would be forthcoming.. But most law teachers shirk this problem--even most of
those who, sometimes under the egis of Natural Law, say that moral
values must occupy a key position in legal education. The schools are
foregoing a splendid opportunity for moral leadership, thanks to their
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almost obsessive interest in the legal rules and in the appellate phases
of the judicial process.
8.
On account of that obsession, they provide no special training for
the future trial judge, although trial court judging is far more complex
and difficult than upper court judging.
One shocking consequence is that we have trial judges who confess-and doubtless others who act likewise without so confessingthat, in passing on the credibility of witnesses, they employ such outrageously stupid rules-of-thumb as these: a witness is indubitably lying
if, when testifying, he blushes about the ears; or throws his head back;
or shifts his gaze rapidly; or raises his right heel from the floor; or
bites his lip; or twists his hands; or taps steadily on his chair. Think
of the effects on citizens' lives and fortunes of decisions by such judges.
9.
The law schools have begun to move a few steps in the direction
of actual practice outside the appellate courts. Some schools have
courses in draftsmanship and in the negotiation of contracts. Some
attempt to simulate trials and preparation for trials. That's good, as
far as it goes, but it doesn't go very far. Such teaching is unnecessarily
awkward and superficial.
In most of the simulated law school trials, the witnesses are makebelieve witnesses. They do not testify to anything they saw and heard;
they testify to what they're told they saw and heard. The whole business is play acting. In a recent article, describing a course in lawyer's
"counselling," you will read that the role of the "client" was "played"
by one of the professors. In another such article, the professor says
frankly that "he had to manufacture the problems."
Why use fake witnesses and fake clients? Why this masquerading, this pretense? It sounds like children "playing house." No
medical school has its students indulge in a child's game of "playing
doctor," with make-believe patients who must "manufacture" their
ailments.
This ersatz teaching-this shunning of real witnesses, real clients,
real problems, real negotiations, this resort to play acting and imitations-resembles what would be the incompetent training of future
ocean navigators, if restricted to sailing in small sailboats on fresh
water ponds. A little of such teaching is all right, but certainly it's
not enough. What would one say of a medical school where the students never saw an actual surgical operation, never watched a physician
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diagnosing the conditions of actual patients and prescribing for them?
Legal education is supposed to teach men what they are to do in actual
court rooms and law offices. Why not have the students directly observe the real subject matter they're supposed to study, with teachers
acting as enlightened interpreters of what the students observe?
How explain the law schools' use of psuedo-realities? The explanation, I think, is that the schools continue to be dominated by the
Langdell tabu. Hypnotized by Langdell's ghost, they have a sort of
reality-phobia, so that they act as if flesh-and-blood clients, with their
real problems, were untouchable pariahs, so unclean or infected that
contact with them would contaminate the students.
So powerful is this tabu that, last year, a prominent legal educator
declared that a law student "should not be permitted to attend court"
if unaccompanied by a teacher, lest the student, observing cases poorly
tried, might acqluire "bad habits." As most law schools have provided
no guided tours of the courts, this means that, in general, the schools
don't want their students to watch courts in action, until after graduation.
I concede that unguided student visits to court are not very satisfactory; they are simply better than not seeing courts at all. For many
years, I have been urging that, as the veriest minimum of good sense,
law teachers, experienced as trial lawyers, go to court with the students,
and that those teachers, before, during and after the court sessions,
call the students' attention to good and bad trial practices. I'm pleased
to note that Dean Wright, of the University of Toronto Law School
(expressly referring to my suggestion) reports that his school has now
adopted it.
10.
But the guided tour of the courts represents a feeble start in closing the gap in legal education. In order to close that gap, it must be
recognized that it resulted from the law schools' complete abandonment
of the old apprentice system. I have never advocated a return to that
old system in its old form. I have, however, for some twenty years,
advocated that the law schools, retaining most of their present teaching
methods, readjust them by adopting a revised apprentice system of the
following kind:
Each law school would build its teaching around a legal clinic.
The clinic would be in charge of full-time professors who had had a
varied experience in practicing law. The clinic would render its services
for little or no fees. It would engage in "legal aid" and "public defense" work. It would also take on other important jobs, such as
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trying cases for government officers, and giving advice to governmental agencies, legislative committees, and quasi-public bodies. The
clinic's activities would thus include almost every kind of legal service
rendered by law offices. Indeed, the clinic would be a law office. The
students, as apprentices of the practicing-lawyer teachers, would engage
in all its activities. The teacher-clinicians would discuss in detail with
the student apprentices the more generalized aspects of the legal rules
pertinent to the specific matters handled by the clinic. The teachers
would, too, illuminate the defects in our tiial methods and the need for
reform; and would also sensitize the students to other moral problems
of lawyerdom. Theory and practice would thus constantly intertwine.
In every field other than the legal, educators agree that the best
education consists of learning by doing. In the law school clinics, the
students, through active participation in the doings, would learn, among
other things, the following: (a) The hazards of a jury trial; how juries
decide cases; the irrational factors that frequently count with juries;
the slight effect that the judge's instructions concerning the complicated legal rules often have on verdicts. (b) How legal rights are
affected by lost papers, missing witnesses, perjury and witnesses'
prejudices. (c) The effects of trial judges' fatigue, alertness, laziness,
conscientiousness, patience, biases and open-mindedness. How legal
rights may vary with the trial judge who happens to try the case, and
with his varying and often unpredictable reactions to various kinds of
witnesses and litigants. (d) By participating in the preparation of
briefs, both for trial and upper courts, the student would learn about
legal rules in the exciting context of live cases. (e) Again, in a living
context, the student would be instructed in the methods used in negotiating contracts and in the settlement and prevention of litigation.
(f) He would also learn "creative" draftsmanship-the handling of
novel fact-materials thrown at the lawyer by his client, and sometimes
worked out in negotiations with the lawyer representing the other
party to the bargain. (g) He would learn, too, by close-up study, of
administration in action and of legislation in action. He would come
to know the realities behind "the legislative intention," the "purpose
of the legislature."
Besides those teachers who serve in the clinics, there would be
others who would give courses in more general subjects, including
jurisprudence, ethics, legal history, and the social studies in their bearing on matters legal. But all the teaching would revolve about the
clinic, which would be the hub of the school.
I am not impressed by the stock argument that the law schools
have too little time, in three years, to teach what they now do and also
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to add clinical teaching. For, in most schools, the greater part of the
time is now spent in teaching a relatively simple technique-that of
analyzing court opinions, "distinguishing cases," studying and criticizing legal rules and doctrines as they are applied by courts to facts
already "found." Three years, or the bulk of them, is much too long
for training in that technique. Intelligent students can learn it in a
year, at most. Teach it to them intensively with respect to one or two
subjects-say "contracts" and "torts"-and they'll have no trouble in
employing it with respect to other subjects.
The intelligent student grows bored when required to do that
job in school over and over again, in a microscopic manner, and never
with reference to a live client or a real law suit. More, this myopic
"case method" can't possibly, in three years, cover more than a small
fraction of the legal field. The students should be obliged to read text
books on dozens of legal topics, in that way acquiring at least a nodding
acquaintance with their leading doctrines and special vocabularies.
Reduction of the number of subjects to which the case method is
now applied, would leave ample time for clinical work; and, in that
work, the students, with a lively interest, would have to study the legal
rules with exceeding care.
Would teachers, by practicing in the clinics, lose the capacity or
lack the time to teach? I have two answers: First, that has not been
the experience of the medical schools. Second, the dean of Harvard
Law School now practices on the side, with no adverse effect on his
teaching.
Clinical teaching should not be confused with post-graduate apprenticeship in private law offices. That kind of apprenticeship has
proved undesirable and inefficient for several reasons: Since it comes
after the student has left the law school, his education in theory and
in practice are artificially separated. Moreover, as pointed out by a
Canadian law teacher who has seen post-graduate apprenticeship in
operation, the "tempo and other conditions of modern life make it
difficult for the busy practitioner to discharge his duty to train the
student in the practice of law."
One may, then, be skeptical when one hears that, even without
required post-graduate apprenticeship, the student, after graduation,
will quickly learn from older lawyers all that the school hasn't taught
him about practice. Perhaps sometimes he will, if at once he becomes
associated with a law firm made up of experienced lawyers. But what
of the graduates who, as many do, immediately embark on their own
practice? They will victimize their first clients. Is it fair to allow
young lawyers to make guinea pigs of unsuspecting clients?
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11.

I have left out many details of my criticisms and suggestions. As
to them, I ask leave to incorporate by reference some of my earlier
writings.*
II
THE HUMANITIES

1.

I trust the reader will pardon a highly personal note by way of a
reply to one astonishing criticism of my suggestions. Several legal
educators have said, in effect: "This man favors crude practicality to
the exclusion of all else. He would have the law schools turn out mere
technicians, legal garage mechanics, lawyers devoid of any interest in
research, scholarship, or theory, or in speculation about ideals, morals,
or in anything not strictly legal."
I could easily prove, by quotations from my writings over the past
twenty years, that never have I taken that position, that, on the contrary, I have steadfastly opposed it. Repeatedly, after describing what
I thought ugly legal realities at variance with professed legal ideals, I
have tried, in my own feeble fashion, to assist in bringing about reforms
designed to actualize some of those ideals.
Nor, I think, can I fairly be charged with antipathy to or concerning research or scholarship. I have done a bit of both, and have
always encouraged my students to engage in such undertakings. As
to theory, often in what I've published and always in my limited law
school teaching, I have quoted Mr. Justice Holmes. "We have," he
said, "too little theory in the law, rather than too much . . . The
most important improvements . . . are improvements in theory. It

is not to be feared impractical, for, to the competent, it simply means
getting to the bottom of the subject. .

.

. To an imagination of any

scope, the most far-reaching form of power is not money, it is the
command of ideas."
Equally important is the detection of unacknowledged theories
that govern men but of which they are unaware, since those hidden
theories may have practical results, sometimes most undesirable. "Practical men," wrote J. M. Keynes, "who believe themselves to be quite
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slave of some
defunct economist." The equivalent may be said of many "practical"
lawyers.
* Citations will be furnished upon request to the author.
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Theories, then, hidden or acknowledged, good or bad, may have
immense practical significance. Theorizing may have other values,
including the sheer pleasure of idly speculating. In passing it may be
noted that, paradoxically, theories devised with utter disregard of
utility, have often had later startling utilitarian effects. A good example is the invention of non-Euclidian geometries.
But, especially in the legal realm, theorizing unrelated to practice
may be seriously misleading. To quote Mr. Justice Holmes again,
"The practical is disagreeable, a mean and stony soil, but from that it
is that all theory comes." So, I submit, legal theory that overlooks
the practices of the trial courts is bound to be anemic. And that anemia
may be pernicious anemia, because it may lead to arid abstractionsand thence to dogmatism. As Aristotle said, "Those whom devotion
to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant are too ready to
dogmatize on the basis of a few observations." He also said. that
"credit must be . . . given to theories only if they accord with the

observed facts," and that the truth in practical matters "is judged
from observation and life, for the decisive factor is found in them."
I might stop there in answering those who say I worship the
crudely practical. But I am not content to stop there. I shall try to
cut deeper.
2.
Legal education, at its best, should have three parts or provinces:
(1) At one end is the province of the trial court, the trial lawyer and
the office lawyer. (2) In the middle is the province of upper courts
and upper court lawyers. (3) At the other end is the province in
which lies the relation of courts and lawyers to matters commonly
regarded as not legal-such matters as the so-called, badly miscalled,
''social sciences," and the "humanities."
At a casual glance, one might perhaps suppose that the first
province-that of the trial and office lawyer-is alone the home of the
practical. But the middle (upper court) province is also the concern
of practical lawyers. I shall try to show that the province at the other
end-that which includes the apparently non-legal-is likewise, for
lawyers, within the practical.
In the middle province-that of appellate courts-the law schools
have done an excellent job, and are doing a constantly better one. I
think, however, that they have failed in the provinces at either end.
I have already mentioned their inadequacy at the first, or more obviously practical, end. I shall now indicate why I think they are deficient at the other ("non-legal") end-and why that deficiency affects
their adequacy in the trial area.
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3.
In the law school I attended as a student in the early part of the
century, almost all the teachers discouraged law student interest in the
social implications of what courts do. - This was the more deplorable
since a majority of the students, as undergraduates, had paid relatively
little heed to the social studies, but had majored in the "liberal arts."
Subsequently there began a movement (in which I eagerly joined) to
alter the law schools' curricula so as to give marked consideration to
the social studies. To a certain extent, this movement has succeeded.
Its aim was admirable. What we ambiguously call "law" is linked
with economics, politics, cultural anthropology, and ethical ideals. The
legal rules embody social policies or ideals, whether or not that fact
is consciously recognized; and, as Mr. Justice Holmes often said, those
policies and ideals should become ever more conscious. Also, we know
too little of the social consequences of the existing legal rules or of the
potential social consequences of proposed changes in those rules. There
the social studies can be most helpful.
If I were to criticize the law schools in that respect, it would be
for not, as yet, having gone far enough in exploiting the social studies
-although I would caution that the products of those studies are most
unlikely to be as reliable as some persons expect them to be, since the
social studies are not, and inherently cannot be, "sciences," in the sense
of yielding any considerable exactness or much in the way of precise
predictions.
While, even so, this movement in the law schools-sometimes
called the "social science approach"-has undoubtedly been valuable,
it involved a serious danger, thanks to the circumstances which chanced
to accompany it. For, almost concomitantly with its advent, there
occurred a change in the interests of most undergraduates who entered
the law schools. Today, most of these students have already acquired,
in their pre-legal years, a substantial knowledge of the social studies.
Today the trouble is almost the opposite of what it was in my law
student days. Now altogether too large a proportion of law students
have .scant acquaintance with the "humanities." Judge Vanderbilt's
recent stimulating Report on Prelegal Education confirms this comment. He reports that, these days, 63%o of law students have had as
their chief undergraduate interest the "social sciences, i and only 10%
had majored in the "humanities."
This unfortunate hole in the law students' pre-law-school training
has rendered dangerous the "social science approach" in legal education, since that approach tends to be one-sided, and needs to be modified
by attitudes gleaned from the "humanities." Let me explain.
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4.
Imitating the less imaginative among the sociologists, some of the
more extreme sponsors of the social studies in the law schools have
attempted to carry over into those studies the quantitative methods of
the physical sciences.
Arthur Koestler warns that the attitude thus engendered may
deaden ethical judgments. "The transfer," he writes, "from the physical to the ethical level, of principles of quantitative measurement . . .
has produced the most disastrous results"-as in the ruthless policies
of the totalitarian governments. "Our quantitative criteria let us down
just at the point where the pros and cons are balanced and ethical
guidance is needed."
But even when the error of undue reliance on the quantitative
has been avoided, the "social science" view, by magnifying the importance of social phenomena-i.e. mass phenomena-and of social or
mass trends, has tended, injuriously, to reinforce the law schools' excessive preoccupation with the legal rules. For not only does emphasis
on mass phenomena mean, necessarily, an emphasis on generalizations,
but, in the legal realm, generalizations about society are of value primarily in testing the social effects of existing legal rules or of proposed
changes in those rules. This is shown by the famous "Brandeis briefs."
The facts in those briefs were general social facts, "mass" facts.
Both trial courts and upper courts ought often to pay attention
to such general or "mass" facts. But the distinctive fact-finding function of trial courts relates to a quite different sort of facts-the individual facts of particular law suits, such as whether Robinson hit McCarthy, whether Artful agreed to sell his house to Guileless, whether
old lady Rich was of sound mind when she signed her will. In trying
to ascertain such specific facts, a trial court gets little or no hetp from
"social facts," from generalizations about mass social phenomena.
These generalizations relate, so to speak, to the social macrocosm. The
trial courts' distinctive task of fact-finding relates to the individual
microcosms.
The so-called "social science approach," then, may be harmful in
that it tends to foster, among law teachers and their students, an indifference, and therefore, an insensitivity, to the unique particular
features of particular law suits. And sensitivity to those uniquenesses
is imperative, if the trial courts are to do real justice, to avoid cruel,
callous injustices.
Those who most eagerly sponsor the "social science" view of matters legal are wont to proclaim that it brings to attention grave ethical
issues and thus sharpens the sense of justice. Doubtless it does-with

36

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

reference to the legal rules. Paradoxically, however, it tends, by overvaluing the social background, to create a blindness to the foregroundto the concrete issues of fact in individual law suits-and thereby
tends to blunt the sense of justice (or, as Edmond Calm wisely calls it,
the sense of injustice) with reference to the operations of trial courts.
For, as I have said, in the faulty methods of trial court fact-finding
lurks a major ethical problem which has been by-passed by those who
devote themselves almost exclusively to the legal rules. Tragic injustices may result when a trial judge applies the best made-the most
ethical-rule to facts he mistakenly "found," facts that never actually
occurred, spurious facts.
Of course, I am not so foolish as to deny the virtue, the validity,
of generalizations. Whether in the natural sciences, or the social
studies, or in the legal field, we cannot dispense with them. They are
formulations of relations between particulars; and those relations have
as much reality as the particulars, although of a different kind. To
use philosophic terms, excessive "nominalism" and excessive "realism"
are equally absurd.
Especially so, when it comes to human problems. Every man is
a social being. Indeed, as John Dewey says, the words "individual"
and "social" should be used not as nouns but as adjectives. Each of
those words, says Dewey, "is a name for what is intrinsic in the constitution and development of human beings."
The social studies underline the adjective "social." That they
do so is unexceptionable. But the resultant generalizations can be
menacing, if incautiously applied in judging particular men in particular law suits. In such judging, the adjective "individual" ought
always be underlined. When legal scholars, unduly fascinated by the
social generalizations, ignore that adjective, they deserve the strictures
of William James who regarded as "pernicious and immoral the talk
of the sociological school about averages,
valuing of individuals. .... "

.

.

.

with its . . . under-

Some remarks of Aristotle are also apposite here. "Practical
wisdom," he wrote "is not concerned with universal§ only-it must
also recognize particulars, .

.

. for practice is concerned with the par-

ticulars," with "the ultimate particular facts." So the "physician does
not cure man, but some particular person." So, too, it is with the trial
judge. Like the physician, he employs "practical wisdom." In the
cases he hears and decides, he does not treat with man in general, or
with types of men, but with particular persons-particular litigants 4nd
witnesses.
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They have common attributes, to be sure., But each of them also
has his unique, differentiated characteristics that ought not to ,be shoved
into a pigeon-hole or taken as merely illustrations of an average. The
personalities of individual men may perhaps be looked upon as variations on the theme of "man in general." But delicate comprehension
of the individual variations is all-important in doing justice in trial
courts.
Let me not be misunderstood. I heartily favor the use of the
social studies in the law schools. Efforts along that line should increase and be much improved. However, as already, indicated, I do
earnestly criticize exaggerated, one-sided, use of those studies. Although the legal rules embody social policies, and although those policies
ought to be based on the maximum attainable knowledge of the actual
and potential workings of our society, nevertheless the judicial applications of those rule-embodied policies take place, for the most part, in
trial court decisions in individual law suits relating to individual human
beings. The legal rules, and the social policies they express, are generalities. They represent what may be termed the wholesale phase of
the judges' work. But in deciding particular cases, trial judges do a
retail business, one in which they must fit the general rules to the needs
of their individual customers, the specific litigants. If that fitting is
carelessly done, injustice ensues. Trial court decisions should not be
mass-production commodities. They should be hand-made.
Take simple examples: No decent person denies the moral soundness of the rule against murder or the rule invalidating profits made by
a fiduciary from his personal use of trust funds. But when, through a
trial court's belief in mistaken testimony, an innocent man is convicted
as a murderer, or an honest trustee is ordered to pay a large sum to his
beneficiaries, then a tragic moral evil results, the administration of
justice miscarries; the trial court's hand-made decision is a botch.
5.
If the trial judge is to do his job well, he must have a capacity for
"empathy"-for "feeling himself into" the motives and moods of other
persons, the witnesses and litigants, each with his own singularities.
The judge should know that no man is a morality-play figure, a Mr.
Worldly Wiseman or a Mr. Faithful, all of one piece. He should
understand that each man is a unique bundle of varieties and inconstancies. The trial judge should, too, understand himself, his own
prejudices and varying moods as they affect his estimates of witnesses, and should make allowance for those prejudices and moods.
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To quote old Sir Thomas Browne, he should "understand not only the
varieties of men, but the variations of himself, and how many men he
hath been"-and, I would add, how many men he is and will be.
Obviously, then, the trial judge's job calls for insights of a kind
that the "social scientists" cannot supply, as their business is with
generalities, abstractions, gross averages. The experts in those needed
insights are the great literary artists-those who are poets, whether
they write in verse or in prose, whether they be dramatists, novelists
or essayists. They have poetic insights, a knowledge which, unlike that
of the scientists, concerns the particular, the unique. Such "poetic"
writers-for instance, Shakespeare, Montaigne or Pascal-furnish a
needed corrective of generalizations in meeting individual human problems, the very sort of problems daily presented to trial judges.
Because, then, intensive study of trial court judging should loom
large in legal education, the law schools-without abandoning the invaluable study of the social implications and effects of the legal rulesshould encourage their students, and the undergraduates who will be
their students, to become avid readers of "poetic" writings.
6.
A few years ago Professor Fred Rodell of Yale University invented a new course, that of teaching law students to write about legal
subjects for non-lawyers. (I assisted him once in giving that course.)
The results were gratifying. The students, obliged to translate into the
American language what they had previously. written in formal legal
jargon, learned how much they had theretofore substituted legal stereotypes for hard thinking. They learned, too, to communicate more
effectively with laymen, including future clients, as well as with judges,
administrators, and members of legislative committees. In short, they
improved their ability to make words behave.
But they learned sormething even more valuable. Obliged to
peer behind words to the realities that words are used to symbolize,
they discovered that language has inescapable limitations, that there
are limits to what one can do with language, that there are moods and
feelings which elude verbal expression. Honest writing about such
moods and feelings must contain, expressly or implicitly, many asterisks.
That, above all, is what creative reading of "poetic" writing
teaches. Listen to Pascal, a profound poetic philosopher as well as
a noted mathematician. "The heart," he said, "has its reasons, which
reason does not know .

.

. The heart has its own order, the intellect
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has its own, which is by principle and demonstration. The heart has
another (order) . . . We know truth not only by reason, but also
by the heart . . . And reason must trust those intuitions of the
heart." Then he made a comment which, for my present purposes,
hits the center of the target: The intuitions "are felt rather than seen;
there is the greatest difficulty in making them felt by those who do
not perceive them." In intuitive judgments, one proceeds "without
technical rules, for their expression is beyond all men."
Pascal, as a mathematician, was a master of logic. He saw that
logic-as that word's etymology discloses-is a creature of language
and that, accordingly, it shares the weakness of language. Such awareness should not induce us to abjure logic (reason). It should induce
us to regard logic (reason) and emotions as polar aspects of a single
process. We err, as Lancelot Whyte insists, when we divorce the
two, treating each as a distinct entity, and when we then consider
"reason" or "intellect" as unaffected by emotions. The "false dilemma," declares Demos, of choosing between "poesy" and reason
"contains a threat to our civilization." From that dilemma, a language-created dilemma, "poetic" writings can rescue us. As Hayakawa
says, the "great writers . . . thought earnestly, felt deeply, and observed accurately, the world of not-words."
In the spirit of Pascal, William James protested against the tradition that considers logic-"discursive thought"--"the sole avenue to
truth." "We need often," he said, "to fall back on unverbalized life"
which is "more of a revealer . . ." The philosopher Whitehead,
famed for his early studies in logic, reached much the same conclusion.
"The basis of experience is emotional," he wrote. "In respect to intuitions . . . language is peculiarly inadequate." And logic, he con-tinued, has its dangers because it "presupposes linguistic adequacy"
and thus excludes "direct intuitions" from "explicit attentions" in its
formulas. From too much respect for the possibilities of language,
there issues a demand for impossible clarity. "It is not true," said
Whitehead, "that elements of experience are important in proportion
to their clarity in consciousness . . Insistence on clarity at all costs
is based on sheer superstition as to the mode in which the human intellect functions. Our reasonings grasp at straws for premises and
float on gossamer for deductions . ."
Whitehead's brilliant disciple, Mrs. Langer, speaks of "wordless knowledge" and "non-logical truth." Language, she maintains,
"is a very poor medium for expressing our emotional nature. It . . .
the intricacies of inner
fails miserably in any attempt to convey . .
experience, the interplay of feelings with thought and impressions."
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Nor is intuition irrational. Much that we call "intuitive knowledge,"
she writes, is "itself perfectly rational, but not to be conceived through
language." Such knowledge, she counsels, can be better expressed in
the symbols of the arts. Similarly, the scientific philosopher, Sullivan,
says in his essay on Beethoven: "We are conscious of so much that
cannot be stated in the form of propositions; desire illumination on
so many things that the language of logic is incompetent to deal with.
And the miracle of art is that it can convey just those messages, satisfy
just those needs."
Whitehead, in challenging the demand for clarity at all costs, was
patently referring to Descartes who, in spite of his own fruitful intuitions, sought to eliminate imagination from all branches of science,
reducing them all to mathematics which, he thought, alone possessed a
language capable of expressing and communicating clear and precise
ideas. Whitehead, thinking of the evil collateral effects of this Cartesian thesis, uttered this warning: "The folly of intelligent people,
clear-headed and narrow-visioned, has precipitated many catastrophes."
Lawyers should never forget that warning. Logic in the hands
of Cartesian-minded judges inflicts the cruelest injustices, and in the
name of Justice. Such judges refuse to listen to the "reasons of the
heart." They recall Pascal's remark: "This man is a mathematician
. He would take me for a proposition."
Our ablest judges are in accord with Pascal, James and Whitehead. Mr. Justice Holmes, in a judicial opinion, wrote of the validity
of an "intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up
many unnamed and tangled impressions .

.

. which may lie beneath

consciousness without losing their worth." Said a wise English judge,
Lord Macmillan: "There is a danger even in logic in human affairs
I think there is a proneness inthe legal mind to put too much
reliance on the power of words." Judge Curtis Bok writes that, for
him as a trial judge, "each case [is] a work of art, and not . . . a
scientific demonstration . . . It is here, at the point of the greatest
judging, that the law can cease to be a matter of rule . . . and reach
the realm of intangibles. The law . . . is not scientific in the sense

of a science whose rules are impersonal and beyond the reach of human
emotions."
There you have it: The judge, especially the trial judge, should,
among other things, be an artist, quick with poetic insights. For such
insights are moral insights. Creative reading of "poetic" writing, by
opening up vistas of the world of not-words, will stimulate such moral
insights.
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7.
I'm especially pleased to quote Judge Bok because the point I'm
making applies with peculiar pertinence to the trial judge. Such a
judge, in a non-jury case, after listening to orally-testifying witnesses
whose stories disagree with one another, has a reaction in favor of
one side or the other. Just why he believes some witnesses and disbelieves others, just why, on the "facts," he thinks the decision should
go for the plaintiff or the defendant, he will often be at a loss to state
precisely., His reaction, a composite (or "gestalt"), is often emotionally tinged in a way that is not explicable in words. It has deep
intuitive roots, some of which he himself does not know and of which,
therefore, he can give no complete verbal-logical-report. That is
why many a trial judge resents any requirement that he make and
publish "findings of fact". He feels that any such publication, because
it is truncated, artificial, will misrepresent his mental processes.
I happen to believe that, nevertheless, the trial judge should always
be obliged to make and publish such "findings". The best argument
for so requiring is that the judge's effort to put in verbal form his
intuitive responses to the events of the trial, will tend to compel the
judge to safeguard himself against acting upon hasty impressions
that will not stand up under his own critical scrutiny, a scrutiny imposed by the obligation to communicate to others. It is superficial to
say derisively that his conscious verbal expression of his intuitions is
but an ex post facto "rationalization". For, in that sense, the reasoning of the wisest men may be described as "rationalizing", since almost
surely it flowed from an original intuition.
I wholly agree, however, that often a trial judge cannot state all
his "real reasons", since some of them, especially as to the facts, are
"reasons" of the "heart", the promptings of inexpressible, incommunicable intuitions-at their best, poetic insights, moral insights.
Because the trial judge's fact-premise, as reported in his "findings",
is thus full of asterisks, his reasoning is equally so. He may have
applied to the facts he "found" the most impeccable legal rule with
the most faultless logic, yet often the soundness of his decision can't
be tested by others, including appellate judges. For they can't tell
whether his fact "findings" are correct-that is, whether he made a
correct choice of the oral testimony to be believed. His "findings"
often are inscrutably subjective.
Judge Hutcheson and others have described as "hunches" these
inexpressible insights of the trial judge. Those who scoff at that notion
overlook the fact that Aristotle, the first great master of formal logic,

42

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

although he did not use the word "hunch", highly esteemed the inarticulate hunches, in practical governmental affairs, of the experienced man. Those scoffers also overlook the fact that many eminent
scientists have disclosed that their inventions and discoveries have
been products of hunches, have acknowledged that their logic followed
an "initial intuition".
Even those most precise and logical creatures, the mathematicians,
have admitted that often they arrived at their creative inventions via
hunches. The distinguished mathematician, Hadamard, in his fascinating little book, The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field,
states that there is "hardly any completely logical" mathematical discovery.

"Some intervention of intuition is necessary .

.

. to in-

itiate the logical work."
Then Hadamard goes on to tell us something surprising, something which bears on the problem of the trial judge. Several leading
mathematicians, he says, have reported that their thinking, before they
reach the stage of communication to others, is done without words.
What is more significant, frequently they are baffled in their efforts at
complete communication. "A majority of scientists," notes Hadamard,
"think that the more complicated and difficult a question is, the more
they feel they Must control that dangerous ally," language, "and its
sometimes dangerous precision." Frequently, he says, in the work of
mathematical geniuses, "important links of the deduction may remain
unknown to the thinker himself" because "some parts of the mental
process develop so deeply in the unconscious" that they "remain hidden
from the conscious self" and can not be communicated.
With mathematical genius thus stumped, we should not be disturbed by the fact that the trial judge is unable to make wholly explicit
his far more tangled intuitions, his intuitive reactions, when the oral
testimony is in conflict, as usually it is.
This difficulty in communicating is peculiar to the trial judge,
since it stems from the trial courts' peculiar, distinctive job of factfinding-of picking out those of the disagreeing, orally testifying,
witnesses who are to be believed. The upper court judges do not encounter that difficulty. Virtually all treatises on "legal reasoning"
are seriously deficient because they neglect the trial court, and consider
solely the reasoning of upper courts. Dean Edward Levi's otherwise
excellent recent volume, An Introductionto Legal Reasoning, will serve
as an apt illustration of such a defect.
The law schools teach their students to study judicial opinions with
a similar disregard of the trial courts and their peculiar c6mmunication difficulty. From such study, the student inevitably obtains mis-
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leading, over-simplified, impressions of the judicial process. The student won't understand that process unless he is aware that most decisions of the trial courts were prompted by intuitive responses to the
conflicting oral testimony, intuitions that judicial opinions, whether
those of trial or upper courts, do not-can not-make fully manifest.
According to Hadamard, a like problem arises in the teaching of
advanced mathematics. If a student of that subject restricts himself
to studying a famous mathematical demonstration in its "entirely conscious form"-that is, in the form in which it has been logically stated
for publication-he will not realize that, preceding the rigorously logical formulation, there had been an unconscious and intuitive period
in the mental processes of the mathematician who contrived and published the demonstration. So with the law student. He should be
taught to comprehend that logic "followed an initial intuition" in the
mind of the trial judge. Otherwise, after the student becomes a lawyer,
he will be sorely puzzled-and often cynical-if he tries a case and
compares the decision with the events at the trial. And, should he
become a trial judge, he will be sorely puzzled by his own mental
operations.
Incidentally, what Hadamard tells us of mathematics, and Whitehead's warning about clarity, suggest that unimaginative, stereotyped,
training in mathematics or logic may hinder rather than help the
lawyer.
8.
Something else, in addition to a vivid knowledge of "poetic" writings will contribute to the future lawyer's education-an understanding
of the nature of history-writing. Why will that enlighten the law
student? Because a trial is an exercise in history writing. The trial
court, like the historian, must attempt to reconstruct a segment of the
past, because the facts in a law suit are departed history, past facts
which the trial judge did not himself see or hear. The abler, more
subtle, historians, such as Beard, Becker, Pirenne and Collingvood,
teach the lawyer the perplexing obstacles to any reconstruction of the
past: the unreliability of much testimony,, the fallible subjectivities of
witnesses, the missing documents, the effect of the prejudices of the
historian in piecing together the available evidence.
9.
Can all that I have discussed here fit into teaching in legal clinics?
I think so. Every teacher in such a clinic should himself be a devotee
of poetic writings, quick with poetic-moral insights, sensitive to the
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unique, keenly aware of the role of intuition, alive to the difficulties of
historical reconstruction. In the legal clinic, there should be a fusion
of all the divers "approaches". There should be "law in action" in
the most comprehensive sense, including, among other things, the social
studies in action, the "humanities" in action.
10.
Let me revert for a moment to the "social science" enthusiasts.
They have severely criticized Langdellism. Yet, as I have said, most
of these enthusiasts, with respect to the judicial process, imitate Langdell in concentrating attention on upper courts, in ignoring trials and
trial courts. I think they do so because, were they carefully to observe
trials, they would come upon emotionally upsetting uncertaintiesand these enthusiasts are engaged, in a new fashion, in the old quest
for unattainable legal certainty.
As part of that quest, some of them, contemptuous of legal terminology on the score of its inexactness, substitute a jargon they
fatuously believe to be more exact. Borrowing from the more humorless among the "social scientists", they use a pseudo-scientific vocabulary, which seems precise only because of its drab, abstract, dehumanized, depersonalized character.
A similar trend exists in some contemporary literature. Lionel
Trilling observes that, instead of saying of a man and woman, "They
fell in love and got married," some modem writers say something
like this: "Their libidinal impulses being reciprocal, they activated their
individual erotic drives and integrated them within the same frame of
reference." Not dissimilar locutions will be found in some current
legal writings. When one reads them, one recalls Gilbert's satiric
lines: "If this young man expresses himself in terms too deep for me,
What a very singularly deep young man this deep young man must be."
Of course, all who adhere to the "social science approach" are
not guilty of linguistic monsti'osities; and sometimes our legal vocabulary will be improved by incorporating some sociological terms. But
those who think that sociological lingo promises exactitude would do
well to note that even the mathematicians, with their most precise language, consider that occasionally its precision may be "treacherous".
11.
Much of what I have said might be rephrased as follows: (1) Our
society should be viewed, in part, as it is viewed by wise cultural
anthropologists, like Sapir, Malinowski, or Ruth Benedict. The "social science approach," when properly used, gives us that view, an

1951]

BOTH ENDS AGAINST THE MIDDLE

essential one for lawyers, because much of what we ambiguously call
"law"-including "international law" and "comparative law"-becomes
intelligible only when seen from the perspective of cultural anthropology. (In the light of my previous discussion, it must be obvious that
I do not mean that such a perspective entails any disregard of the
moral values of our own civilization; on the contrary, it ought to supply a brightened appreciation of those values.) (2) Without neglecting
the cultural-anthropologist's perspective, the individual humans in our
society should be viewed as a wise psychologist or psychiatrist views
them. It is such a psychologist's view that, in the law schools today,
needs more attention.
For lawyerdom is, in great part, the realm of individual psychology. As our legal vocabulary shows, lawyers constantly cope with
individual psychological problems. We lawyers talk, for example, of
"intention", "motive", "mental cruelty", "undue influence". An English judge has said that "the state of a man's mind is [for a court]
as much a fact as his digestion." Every day, trial judges, in trying
to ascertain the facts in law suits, must endeavor to probe the minds
of individual witnesses in order to determine their credibility. Trial
lawyers act as psychologists when they strive to get at the hidden
attitudes of the particular judges before whom they try and argue cases.
The lives and fortunes of litigants depend upon the motivations and
prejudices of specific witnesses, judges, jurors. To be effective as a
court-house lawyer or on the bench is to be an effective individual
psychologist. The same is true of the lawyer who conducts negotiations or appears before legislative committees.
Now our wisest psychologists-for example, William James, Sigmund Freud, or Erich Fromm-have been men with deep poetic insights. More to the point, for inspiration in their professional undertakings they have turned to the "poetic" writers. Let lawyers and
judges go and do likewise. No trial judge who follows that example
will employ the ridiculous rules of thumb for determining witnesses'
credibility to which I earlier referred.
The practice of law is not a science but an art. Legal practitioners
can learn much from the practitioners of literary art. I quote Whitehead once more: "All men enjoy flashes of insight beyond meanings
already stabilized in etymology and grammar. Hence the role of
literature in finding linguistic expressions for meanings as yet unexpressed."
12.
Do I propose, then, that a judge should be a literary man, should
himself be a "poetic" writer? Not at all. Whether a judge writes
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with grace and beauty matters comparatively little. It is his spirit
that matters. I mean what Cardozo perhaps meant when, quoting
Graham Wallas, he said that we need judges "with a touch in them
of the qualities which make poets." Such judges will have a "piety
for the unique." That piety opposes an "individualism" which treats
human beings as but homogeneous units. Instead it dwells on individuality.
13.
Thus far I have singled out those portions of the "humanities"
which stimulate penetrating intuitions, moral insights. Plainly, the
"humanities" will yield far more.
A lawyer should be a cultivated man. He will indeed be merely
a legal garage mechanic if ignorant of the interplay of legal and nonlegal ideas. He should have a cognizance of the numerous legal concepts and attitudes that have stemmed from. non-legal sources, from
philosophy and science. Consider, for instance, the influence of Aristotle on the notion of "proximate cause." I have lbeen distressed to
discover that many law students have never heard of Susanna and the
Elders, or of Judge Bridlegoose, or of Pericles' speech on democracy
(according to Thucydides); don't know the meaning of "Occam's
razor", or the "idols of the tribe", or "non-Euclidean thinking"; have
no acquaintance with non-legal discussions of "fictions"; have read little or nothing of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas or Kant; and look blank at
the mention of Democritus, Lucretius, Pelagius, Leibnitz, Comte, C. S.
Peirce, or even Bentham.
On the other hand, the law student should learn how legal concepts and attitudes have spread into other fields. He should know,
for instance, the following: The scientific and philosophic idea of
"cause" apparently came originally from the lawyers; so, too, the
notion of "average". Perhaps, as Helen Silving suggests, one can
trace to the lawyers the use of the word "facts" to signify "realities".
The "Socratic method" was transplanted from the courts. The philosophic, legal, and scientific concepts of "natural law" have repeatedly
interacted. Lawyers have made notable contributions to the "logic of
discovery". Three lawyers were members of the small 'philosophic
group that launched American pragmatism.
CONCLUSION

I make a plea, then, for greater stress on the "humanities", both
in pre-legal education and in the law schools. That plea could rest
on sheer practicality, on the argument that men not steeped in "hu-
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mane" learning will be neither first-rate lawyers nor first-rate judges.
But that is not my whole argument, by any means. I say that, without such learning, a lawyer cannot be an effective participant in a
vital civilization. Nor is a lawyer's life confined to his professional
or his public activities. He has, or should have, many hours of private
leisure. His private leisure will be far more fruitful, far more a source
of personal happiness, well-being, if he has enriched his spirit by intimate creative knowledge of the "humanities".

